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George A. MacLean 
Self-Interest in Canadian Foreign Policy: 
The Principle and Practice of Internationalism 
Abstract 
Internationalist impulses in Canadian foreign policy are best understood 
from both functional and ideological perspectives. This article suggests that 
the practice and principle of Canadian internationalism reflect a set of core 
values emanating from domestic society, as well as an indispensable empha-
sis on multilateralism in foreign policy. The article explores the tradition of 
Canadian internationalism, multilateral instincts evident in collective action, 
and the core values which are entwined in the constitutional premise of 
"peace, order, and good government" (POGG). The article concludes that, 
though paradoxical upon first examination, Canada's cooperative interna-
tionalist tradition was and remains fundamentally self-interested. 
Résumé 
C'est tant du point de vue fonctionnel que du point de vue idéologique que 
Von peut mieux comprendre les dimensions internationalistes de la politique 
étrangère canadienne. Le présent article donne à entendre que la pratique et 
le principe de l'internationalisme canadien reflètent, d'une part, une série de 
valeurs fondamentales issues de la société nationale et, d'autre part, l'impor-
tance accordée au multilatéralisme dans la politique étrangère. L'article se 
penche sur la tradition internationaliste du Canada, sur l'instinct multi-
latéral ancré dans l'action collective ainsi que sur les valeurs fondamentales 
imbriquées dans le principe constitutionnel « de paix, d'ordre et de bon 
gouvernement » (POBG). Il conclut que, quoiqu 'il semble paradoxal à 
première vue, la tradition de coopération internationaliste du Canada a été 
et est mue essentiellement par ses propres intérêts. 
Introduction 
Reg Whitaker noted that two principal factions had emerged in the field of 
Canadian foreign policy analysis. He pointed out that, on the one hand, 
there were a number of scholars who held a "nostalgic lament for a lost 
golden age"; on the other was a group "impatient with traditional categories 
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... [who] do not worry about having lost their place" (Whitaker 2004). A 
scholarly divide was not that surprising in the context of an increasingly 
globalized system, but it emerged as the adjustment to the new era that left 
more questions than answers regarding Canada's foreign relations. Given 
what was at stake - relations with allies, defence and aid budgets, and the 
very ideological direction for foreign policy - one might assume of the 
factions that ne'er the twain should meet, and that the study of Canadian 
foreign policy would bifurcate into opposing camps with no hope for 
middle ground. However, those differing perspectives meet on one signifi-
cant point: the primacy of internationalism in Canadian foreign policy. 
Internationalism may be defined as cooperation among countries for the 
purpose of mutual benefit. Manifest in a variety of forms - political, 
economic, military, developmental - internationalism at its most basic 
level holds promise for long-term collective interests as opposed to atom-
istic short-term gains. Yet underlying internationalism is a set of ideas and 
values that make up a comprehensive vision of the world that, once real-
ized, would bring with it a peaceful environment and a more favourable 
standard of living. In the Canadian context, internationalism is assumed to 
result in benefits at home as well as abroad. But from where does this 
impulse emerge? And what are the sources of its future direction? 
This article examines the practice and principle of Canadian interna-
tionalism. Broadly speaking, it argues the Canadian internationalist 
impulse can be explained from both functional and ideological perspec-
tives. Functionally, internationalism through multilateralism gives 
Canada greater input at the table. Ideologically, internationalism repre-
sents a dominant vision for foreign policy reflecting the core values of 
Canadian society. The article explores the history of internationalist 
impulses in Canadian foreign policy, connecting it with the logic of 
collective action inherent in multilateralism. It suggests that an important 
link may be made with the values and principles entwined in peace, order, 
and good government (POGG) in domestic Canadian politics, and 
concludes that there has been little substantive change in policy over the 
past decade. In what appears paradoxical at first glance - but far more 
reasonable upon reflection - the practice and principle source of Canada's 
cooperative pursuit remains more self-interested than selfless. 
Canadian Internationalism 
To begin, one must distinguish Canadian internationalism from other 
variants. It is not, for instance, proletarian internationalism which seeks 
(once sought?) a world revolution through worker solidarity (Waterman 
1991). Nor is it the "internationalism" of citizen-based organizations such 
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as the World Federalists Movement or Citizens for Global Solutions that 
seek a form of constituted authority for global institutions. And, though 
Canada's internationalism has included a focus on the role for interna-
tional organizations, it is not merely institutionalism. Rather, as explored 
below, organizations provide a functional means to achieve the objectives 
of Canadian internationalism. 
It may seem intuitive to speak of internationalism in foreign policy 
since every nation-state seeks to affect global politics at some level. 
However, the emphasis on institutions, coupled with a unique and 
dependent relationship with the United States, makes Canadian interna-
tionalism idiosyncratic. And as Brian Stevenson has observed, Canadian 
internationalism has evolved from the "middlepowermanship" of its 
"golden age" of the 1940s and 1950s to a more institutional and issue-
specific form today (Stevenson 2000: 52, 157). The distinctive relation-
ship with the United States - with its associated costs and benefits -
framed Canada's security and economic relationship in an inimitable 
way. These two points - the growing emphasis given to international 
organizations and the implications of the Canada-US relationship - were 
the bedrock of Canada's evolving internationalist bent. 
Functionalism: Multilateralism and Collective Action 
The post-war experience of institution building was a source of Canada's 
evolving internationalism, as this provided an effective functional basis 
for enhancing its global influence. Canada's foreign policy at this time no 
doubt contained an ideological element - more on that later - but its func-
tional design was crucial. Collaboration, cooperation, and compromise 
through multilateral bodies such as the UN and NATO bore clear results 
over what surely would have been a greatly diminished role among 
nations. Internationalism during the golden age progressively became 
more multilaterally based. Indeed at the time, the two terms were often 
linked: in 1948, for example, Lester Pearson said that multilateralism was 
"another name for internationalism" (Pearson 1970: 69). 
KimNossal has described the features of Canadian internationalism as 
responsible involvement, multilateralism, and a willingness to make prior 
commitments to international institutions (Nossal 1997: 53). Of these 
features, we are most interested in multilateralism, which at once 
envelops all of Nossal's features while providing functional linchpin for 
Canada's internationalism. Multilateralism is the integration of a deci-
sion-making process or approach with three or more independent political 
actors. It is premised on the logic of collective action since it is supposed 
to bring benefits that could not be achieved independently. But it is more 
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than just interaction; it assumes reciprocity among participants, a regu-
lated environment, and shared benefits that would be impossible for states 
to achieve if they acted alone. 
Multilateralism is most commonly associated with the post-war order. 
This early period of multilateral behaviour can be seen as somewhat revo-
lutionary, since the actors involved - initially the allied states - placed 
some faith in the theory that harmonious organizational behaviour would 
produce benefits and prevent further wars. Early approaches to multilater-
alism, notably the Bretton Woods institutional arrangement, were virtu-
ally universal in membership, (and perhaps a far better example of 
globalization than what we witness today). 
But universal multilateralism was not without its drawbacks. Far from 
being a collective source of self-interest on the part of all member states, 
there were certain risks associated with collective action. The assumption 
was that ultimately national interests would be achieved; however, the 
process of collective action evident in multilateralism required states to 
back off their independent maximized goals. In other words, states could 
not possibly achieve everything they sought in a multilateral arrangement 
as there are too many diverse interests and potential antagonisms to 
permit this to happen. However inimical multilateralism might seem to a 
state's self-interests, collective action, as Mancur Olson argued, allows 
states to seek maximized benefits through a process that could leave them 
worse off than if they were to act alone but provides a better assurance of 
collective gains. But states active in multilateral behaviour are not really 
maximizing their objectives; they are seeking to "satisfice," or to obtain 
an outcome that is "good enough." The adage, according to Olson, is that 
benefits "must be available to everyone to be available to anyone" (Olson 
1965). Those collective benefits, ultimately, are more long-term and 
desirable than atomistic gains. 
The post-war evolution of multilateral arrangements involved coordi-
nated national policies, often in a formal organizational structure (Ruggie, 
1993). Since these mutual initiatives were to reap gains that otherwise 
could not be achieved through unilateral action, there was a certain 
normative ideology implied (Caporaso 1992). Not all saw the same 
results - relative power, functional differentiation, and resource capability 
led to asymmetry.1 Beneficial collective action did result in overall 
improved conditions for participants through collective decision making, 
policy coordination, cooperation, and integration. Furthermore, the more 
long-term goal of war avoidance was achieved. Another "revolutionary" 
aspect of early multilateral behaviour was the willingness of great powers 
to satisfice rather than maximize their goals. This dimension of collective 
action - disregarding, to some degree, the impulse to exploit a process or 
248 
Self-interest in Canadian Foreign Policy: 
The Principle and Practice of Internationalism 
situation to meet the self-interest of the nation - showed a sea change in 
foreign policy integration, and a readiness to seek a better way, even with 
costs involved (which meant reduced net benefits for some in exchange 
for overall benefits). 
This might be seen as maximizing in any case, since all involved 
wound up with a process that worked and won support. We now see that 
the outcome of multilateralism was what John Ruggie called "diffuse 
reciprocity," involving coordinated and mutually beneficial relations and 
reciprocal behaviour from partners (Ruggie 1992). There are various 
benefits from a multilateral order. Harmonized pluralistic arrangements 
are a logical option for weaker states seeking influence within the context 
of growing trade, communications, and population movements (Deutsch 
1957). Also, multilateralism is an effective tool for gaining a better under-
standing of the decision-making process that leads to foreign policy 
adjustment and coordination (Keohane 1990).2 And even the smallest of 
multilateral agreements provides participants beneficial opportunities for 
goal attainment through efficient and legitimate decision-making mecha-
nisms (Kahler 1992). 
Beneficial opportunities are one thing; maximized opportunities are 
another. The benefits of collective action were clear, but another dimen-
sion is the tendency to "go small." Organizational behaviour theory 
informs us that small groups are more effective at seeking the individual 
goals of those involved (Miner 2006; DuBrin 2005). Simply put, the more 
involved, the greater the net benefit, but with a cost: reduced individual 
benefit. So, what of smaller groups? Would fewer in the ranks still win 
support, but perhaps with something closer to maximized goals? If satis-
ficing carries a cost, then the costs could be reduced with fewer actors, 
and with more harmonized interests. 
In practice universal multilateralism may have brought benefits to all 
actors - varying, to be sure - but the great powers and their closest allies 
recognized the enhanced potential of smaller, more integrated groups. 
The more actors involved, the more dispersed the benefits will be since 
satisficing implies that some processes will not be pursued. Indeed, the 
best processes for some actors might be disregarded completely because, 
while they might maximize benefits for one or a few, they would mini-
mize or downgrade benefits for others. Better ways, therefore, imply costs 
and may not be optimal for the self-interest of some. Yet multilateralism 
demands collective benefits, which simply cannot be optimal for all. 
Universality compounds the problem. Suboptimal solutions, then, are 
sometimes necessary in order to win support and maintain success for the 
collective: to satisfice, in other words. These were, of course, the industri-
alized nations which changed the nature of multilateral behaviour. 
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More restrictive multilateral arrangements changed the nature of 
collective action. The immediate post-war multilateral order, which was 
premised on institutionalism, rule making, and - most importantly -
universality, gave way to the rise of smaller arrangements, which often 
broke off from the previous multilateral order. Regional associations, free 
trade agreements, and what Miles Kâhler referred to as "minilateral" 
arrangements came to typify the real direction of late twentieth century 
multilateralism: smaller groups, usually geographically collocated, with 
greater potential for substantive integration and, ultimately, greater bene-
fits. Functionally, then, the utility of multilateralism is evident in both its 
universal and minilateral variants. 
Multilateralism and Canada 
The Canadian foreign policy literature has critically explored the concept 
of multilateralism to some extent, (Black and Sjolander 1993; Diebold 
1988) and principal works in Canadian foreign policy have documented 
the rise in multilateral links (Nossal 1997; Cooper 1997; Cutler and 
Zacher 1992). But the broader context of normative goal setting and inde-
pendence in policy has not been examined. Canada has a tradition of 
multilateral behaviour with like-minded states on various aspects of its 
foreign policy, including military, cultural, political, and economic 
affairs. Canada's multilateral tradition reflects Canada's domestic inter-
ests and global ideals, and as Keating has argued, is Canada's "best 
option" for pursuing national and international interests (Keating 2002). It 
has also led to the judgment that Canada's foreign policy is dependent, 
responsive to the wishes and interests of major allies, and devoid of any 
emphasis on and independent of "national interest." Early multilateralism, 
which sought satisficing over maximized individual goals, was not the 
best instance of Canada's self-interest; it could not have been, given the 
diffuse net results of universal multilateralism. At that time, Canada's 
middlepowermanship emphasized integrating policies with other actors, 
and what was available to anyone would be available to everyone. In the 
short term, multilateralism immediately served an important task for 
Canadian foreign and security policy since it allowed Canada to rise 
above the status of observer, and become a more active participant in 
global affairs. It gave Canada a functional role that distinguished it from 
other non-great powers, largely due to the close bilateral relationship it 
shared with the United States. It was a foreign policy more dependent on 
the United States perhaps, but nonetheless more integrated as well. 
Importantly for Canada, the prevalence of antagonistic relations within 
multilateral bodies did not generally extend to the Canada-United States 
relationship, where "self interests were closer to "common" (bilateral) 
interests than for other actors. 
250 
Self-Interest in Canadian Foreign Policy: 
The Principle and Practice of Internationalism 
Another customary assessment of Canadian multilateral commitments 
is that Canada has always been a strong proponent of multilateral behav-
iour for altruistic reasons, or the good of the international system. The 
conventional wisdom is perhaps the greatest perpetrator here, as the "boy 
scout" or international mediator/fair player image is only partly true. 
These tendencies may be part of Canadian foreign policy, but they are not 
necessarily the driver. Real altruism is the exception, not the rule, and no 
benefits could be realized were self-interests not pursued. In other words, 
Canada's foreign policy practice no doubt is legitimately seen as benefi-
cial to the international community, but this does not assume the absence 
of interests. Indeed, this could well result in minimized goals for 
Canadian foreign policy, which is neither realistic nor accurate. 
Drawing from conventional wisdom (Canada as the "selfless 
supporter"), one might question whether there is any national interest in 
Canada's coordination of policies with others. But the broader goals and 
activities of Canadian foreign relations reflect normative values and inter-
ests. Peyton Lyon and Brian Tomlin, among others, have explored the 
conceptions and attitudes that surround Canadian "roles" in world poli-
tics. "Mediator," "middle power," "community-builder," "peacekeeper," 
and "bridge," Lyon and Tomlin suggest, characterize Canadians' self-
perception of their influence in the international system (Lyon and 
Tomlin 1979). However, outside the parameters of a nation's self-percep-
tion, the actual role played is influenced by exogenous factors, as well. 
Canada the "selflessly multilateral nation" (Keenes 1995), is not a 
complete image of Canada's basic objectives in its foreign policy, which 
in fact are really more self-serving. This does not mean Canadian foreign 
policy cannot be beneficial for the international community but rather that 
Canada's basic objectives are not simply selfless or altruistic. In fact, 
Canada's basic objectives are self-interested. 
All of this has a direct, and crucial, bearing on the conduct of Canadian 
internationalism. The belief system underlying multilateralism implies 
that dominant attitudes have an important influence on the decision to 
work with others to achieve goals. Moreover, the fact that all nation-states 
seek objectives in the broader guise of their national interest - pursuing 
policies that create, maintain, and enhance the security and welfare of a 
country - raises an intriguing issue concerning Canada: how to imple-
ment policies in the national interest through collective behaviour (multi-
lateralism)? There are two forces here that are, at first glance, at odds with 
one another: seeking an independent policy, yet doing so within a unified 
or multilateral forum. 
Importantly for Canada, multilateralism creates positive conditions for 
effective action by weaker powers in the international system. As Dewitt 
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and Brown have noted, multilateralism gives "marginally regional actors 
opportunities for responsible participation without the perceived intent or 
actual attributes of great power-style intervention, while ensuring that 
states of and in the region do not lose control over the agenda while 
having a forum ("regime") to constrain the actions of the more powerful" 
(Dewitt and Brown 1995). For smaller states such as Canada, multilater-
alism shows the utility of Ruggie's "diffuse reciprocity": coordinated and 
mutually beneficial relations reached through collaboration, suasion, and 
negotiated assurance can achieve more for non-determining powers than 
unilateral action. For more modest powers such as Canada, working 
together multilaterally secures reciprocal behaviour with partners. 
Seen in this light, multilateralism presents opportunities for Canada 
because coordinated decision making and policy implementation creates 
greater authority and influence in the international system. States that are 
able to determine the structure of the international system, or have close 
access to states that do, are in a position to shape and influence the align-
ment of policies of allies. Favourable multilateral memberships permit 
Canada to affect the policies of larger states in a manner that would be 
impossible if it acted alone. 
Multilateralism actually has led to a degree of independence in 
Canadian foreign relations. Given its middle power status, Canada has 
achieved a level of influence in its foreign policy through organizational 
links with other states that it otherwise would not have realized. 
Consensus building and the ability to articulate independent views simply 
would not be possible were it not for institutional fora that permit the 
involvement and capacity of non-system determining powers. Multi-
lateralism provides greater coordinated decision making and policy 
implementation, and consequently for its participants, greater authority 
and influence in the international system. 
Ideology: Core Values and POGG 
"Peace, order, and good government," or POGG (Section 91, 
Constitutional Act 1867) describes the national source of Canada's inter-
nationalist impulse in foreign policy and draws a connection between the 
foundations of basic law domestically, and the national interest in foreign 
policy. POGG is also found in other constitutional orders, including the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. It describes the legal 
placement of authority within the state, prescribing powers to certain 
levels of government where such authority may not otherwise be so clear. 
Functionally, its purpose is to provide direction for orderly division of 
powers, but POGG also has come to take on a sociological value in 
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Canada: peace, order and good government are often used to describe a 
set of values that underpin Canadian political culture. 
POGG represents a core interest in Canadian foreign policy and is 
important for a variety of reasons. First, it distinctively represents an early 
constitutional premise of hierarchy, institutionalism, and deference to 
authority. It may be differentiated from the United States focus on indi-
vidualism and rights of citizens, for example, which framed state-society 
relations in that country. Although "peace, order, and good government" 
is a less catchy phrase than "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" 
(Declaration of Independence 1776), it reflected a political and social 
order in Canada. 
Second, POGG reflects the Canadian version of the division of 
powers. POGG is a constitutional "residual" clause, meaning that author-
ity not specified for a level of government would be left for the federal 
government (O'Hearn 1964). Here we see the function in the principle. 
Though later employed as an "emergency power" clause in the 1920s 
(Stanley 1969), POGG was intended to deal with problems of authority in 
basic law. 
Third, POGG has been used functionally to represent core Canadian 
national values. George Woodcock argues that constitution building by 
Canadians since 1867 has been a "mission" to assert their national iden-
tity. POGG, then, can be seen as "a largely inarticulate recognition by 
Canadians of the necessary pluralism in the society that various histories 
and a varied geography have combined to give them...a statement 
regarding the nature of the good society that will be of interest and 
perhaps of value to the rest of the world" (Woodcock, in Banting and 
Simeon, 334). Rule of law, equality, diversity, tolerance, freedom, and 
democracy are all predicated on POGG. It is a sui generis definition of 
the package of rights and responsibilities of a society, and is about more 
than "government", it is also about "governance". More than an ideal for 
setting up institutions of authority, it is also an active concept (gover-
nance), and a set of standards. 
POGG, then, is more than a functional principle or a mere constitu-
tional clause. It is also a description of order within civil society, particu-
larly regarding the allocation of power. Often depicted as the Canadian 
"ideal" (perhaps in lieu of something with a better ring to it), the POGG 
clause exemplifies the Canadian emphasis on legitimacy in civil society. 
Indeed, while it may be too one-dimensional to portray Canada's iden-
tity wholly as POGG, there is a wide literature that spells out the connec-
tion between values of Canadian society and the functional purpose of 
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foreign relations. For example, in Continental Divide, Seymour Martin 
Lipset ascertained Canadians were more collective than individual, more 
law abiding, and more linked to society (Lipset 1990). More recently, 
Michael Adams argued that these national characteristics extend to 
foreign policy, as well. His analysis concurs with Lipset's interpretation 
of Canadian society, but goes further to suggest that the same characteris-
tics link Canadians to the global system of politics (Adams 2003). 
The values inherent in POGG have framed Canadian foreign policy 
for a very long time. Six decades ago, Secretary of State for External 
Affairs Louis St. Laurent commented on the "values which lay empha-
sis on the importance of the individual, on the place of moral principles 
in the conduct of human relations, on standards of judgment which tran-
scend mere material well-being." Canadians, he said, had a responsibil-
ity to "protect and nurture" these values (Blanchette 2000: 5). In Right 
and Wrong in Canadian Foreign Policy, James Eayrs spoke of the 
value-laden idealist tradition in foreign policy. Liberal idealism in 
foreign policy, he said, is about improving the standards of life through 
moral progress, decency, and principles of behaviour (Eayrs 1966). The 
ideals, standards, and functions of POGG are the humanitarian impulses 
and tradition of values in Canadian foreign policy. Together with the 
functionalism of multilateral behaviour, the normative foundation of 
POGG represents the values inherent in Canadian foreign policy. 
Moreover, practice and principle in internationalism contribute to the 
national interest. 
Internationalism and the National Interest 
The term "national interest" is necessarily imprecise, since the core inter-
ests of a nation are intangible, perceptual, and normative. Categorizing or 
quantifying the national interest in a manner that satisfies everyone would 
be impossible. It defies concrete definition and therefore is criticized for 
its inability to predict or form an explanatory model. Yet despite its ambi-
guity, it is fundamental for any foreign policy, and shows the underlying 
intent of the decision makers that employ it. 
A country's national interest may be defined as that which contributes 
to its self-preservation, national security, sufficiency, and prestige 
(Osgood 1953). More substantively, however, the interests of a nation are 
influenced by both subjective andobjective bases - this is why the term is 
of little use for predicting behaviour, outside of the widest parameters of 
what matters to a nation's preservation and well-being. A nation's objec-
tive interests are those it seeks to protect though its foreign policy: the 
preservation of its territorial integrity, the maintenance of political admin-
istration, and the defence of its resources, values and identity, for exam-
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pie. Foreign policy decision making and these objective interests form 
something of a tautology: the objective interests exist and inform policy, 
which in turn seeks to maintain and strengthen the interests. There is, 
then, a universal core to these objective interests because they are neces-
sary for the preservation of the state itself. 
National values and political considerations confuse the more self-
evident side of the national interest, creating an ill-defined subjective bias 
that relates to priorities in foreign policy. This subjectivity is often used to 
explain a decision after it has been taken as "in the national interest". 
Subjective considerations, as well as its imprecision, create unavoidable 
problems for applying the national interest. Evaluations change according 
to the individuals involved and the environmental milieu within which the 
decisions themselves are made. This does not mean that the national inter-
est cannot be utilized; rather, foreign policy analysis must strike a balance 
between the objective and immediate concerns of a nation and its political 
values. There are no useful alternatives to the national interest, and it does 
permit a much richer analysis because it incorporates the process and 
prioritization of political decision making. 
Canadian governments generally avoid referring to "interest" in 
discussions of what frames Canadian foreign policy. This is not limited to 
government. David Haglund has suggested that Canadians are not so 
much concerned with the national interest as they are with whether 
Canada should "even stoop to admit" to having one (Haglund 2000: 10). 
It may be that the national interest is seen as more suitable for the United 
States and other great powers, or that it really implies military strategy. In 
any case, the national interest assumes a certain self-interest or egoism 
unfamiliar or repugnant to Canadians; it is somehow "un-Canadian." 
But Canadian foreign policy has always been about self-interest. Any 
other basis for a foreign policy makes no sense. The real problem, as 
Haglund suggests, is admitting that such interests exist at all. Indeed, to 
ignore the national interest would be to pretend that Canadians are unaf-
fected by events in the world. This is clearly not the case, and more to the 
point, there is an irony here. Those who deny a national interest would at 
once likely defend the internationalist tradition. Yet one cannot exist 
without the other. There is a crucial link between a view of a "place in the 
globe" and the interest of the nation as a whole. Canadians are not disin-
terested when it comes to foreign policy. Michael Adams' analysis of 
polling data shows a strong feeling among Canadians regarding their 
global role. Other analyses have similar conclusions (Martin and 
Fortmann 2000). Allan Gotlieb notes that "Canadians are now far more 
conscious than even before of the encroachment of the international envi-
ronment on our daily lives" (Gotlieb 2005: 17), and Jennifer Welsh 
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argues that Canadians believe they "should take part in defining and 
implementing the country's international agenda" (Welsh 2005: 59). 
Internationalism is clearly in the Canadian national interest. Collective 
benefits are best achieved through multilateral institutions, which also 
provide the best opportunity to extend values and principles of behaviour 
abroad. As universal multilateralism gave way to smaller organizational 
structures, the potential for maximized objectives increased; conversely, 
the possibility of net losses also rose. Assumptions of reciprocity 
remained, but collaborative decision making may be more difficult with 
fewer actors and - importantly - the presence of a system-determining 
power. The upshot for Canada was, and remains, clear: maintaining a 
place in the world and protecting benefits through multilateralism in 
smaller numbers. This is internationalism in a nutshell. 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that Canada's tradition of internationalism is 
premised on the institutional mechanism of multilateralism. This is noth-
ing less than a necessity for Canada. Given the alternative, which would 
be a severely degraded role in the international system, multilateralism 
forms the basis of what allows Canada to rise above the level of mere 
observer or largely passive participant status. In the Canadian experience, 
emphasis on multilateralism, in concert with its middle power status, 
permits Canada to have its objectives achieved in the international 
system, even without being a "great" power. (This is not to suggest, of 
course, that the relationship is symmetrical; rather, interdependence does 
not denote equality, but mutual interests.) Instead, multilateralism pres-
ents a functional means of achieving policy goals in Canada. In this sense, 
"functional" is not meant merely to suggest what a state may contribute to 
the international system, but rather how a state's objectives are attained in 
the international system. 
Changes in the global order could lead us to theorize that the integra-
tion of a network of global sub-systems might indicate the end of multi-
lateralism, but the opposite is quite likely more correct. As structures such 
as innovation and communications become increasingly important in the 
determination of state power and influence, the national interest ingrained 
in multilateral relations will continue to grow. Smaller groups mean 
greater potential for harmonized interests and more substantive integra-
tion. Most importantly, smaller groups allow for improved possibilities 
for maximized goals - or at least not simply satisficing - as a net result. 
In addition, this article has argued that there are principles at stake in 
internationalist behaviour. Canadian values, which may be understood 
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through "peace, order, and good government," represent a normative 
vision of the world that could not be achieved in any way through inde-
pendent action. Canadian internationalism has evolved from its earlier 
form, and remains a normatively charged, value-oriented exercise. One of 
the most fundamental questions facing Canada is its ability to exert 
foreign policy initiatives in a relatively independent manner. Acting 
unilaterally is usually not an option, leaving the alternatives of working 
with great powers bilaterally, or through a multilateral regime. The 
element of independence here is crucial: that is to say, it is not merely a 
matter of establishing a foreign policy position, but rather the ability to do 
so in an autonomous manner. There may not be agreement about the 
direction of Canadian foreign policy, but as this article has shown, its 
internationalist impulse is rooted in both practice and principle. 
Notes 
1. Dominant groups will still be more proficient at implementing preferred policy 
options. Multilateralism "works" when a hierarchy exists: major powers must play 
major roles for other players to want to participate. See Peter Cowhey, "Elect 
Locally - Order Globally: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Cooperation," in 
Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters', and Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: 
Comparative Responses to international Economic Crises, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1986). 
2. On the other hand, others have suggested that multilateralism may be explained 
using a variety of theoretical frameworks. James Caparaso argues that the realist 
argument of rational self-serving choice, the liberal social-communicative explica-
tion, and the functional or neo-liberal institutionalist focus on the utility of institu-
tions may all be clarified by multilateralism. See Caporaso, "International 
Relations Theory and Multilateralism." 
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